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ANSWERS TO PRAYER AND 
CONDITIONAL SITUATIONS 
Peter Forrest 
In this paper I defend the Direct Actualisation of Conditional Situations as a 
way of explaining how God answers prayers without assuming that God acts 
on the world after the prayer is made. My hypothesis states that God, in cre-
ating, brings about conditionals without either preventing the antecedent or 
bringing about the consequent. I compare this hypothesis with some rivals, 
notably the appeals to foreknowledge and to middle knowledge. 
My main purpose in this paper is to discuss how answers to prayer are 
possible within the scope of the thesis of divine eternity and without 
reliance on middle knowledge, which many find problematic. Indeed, I 
show how answers to prayer are possible even if a slightly stronger thesis 
holds, namely that there is only one divine act (ODA).l A subsidiary pur-
pose is to show how answers to prayer need not be violations of the natur-
alorder. I concentrate on answers to prayer but my proposal generalises to 
cover all cases of particular providence. You might well ask what reasons 
are there for believing in divine eternity, why anyone would find middle 
knowledge problematic, and why violations of the natural order are wor-
rying unless we play the game of Science Says.2 Answering these questions 
is "beyond the scope of this paper." But to those who neither find divine 
eternity attractive nor violations of the natural order unattractive I com-
mend my hypothesis as not obviously worse than any other. 
I call my hypothesis the Direct Actualisation of Conditional Situations 
(DACS). It says that the act of creation directly results in material condi-
tional situations.' It should be uncontroversial that if DACS is acceptable 
then it makes answers to prayer possible even within the scope of aDA. 
The example I shall use to illustrate this is that of a student with a difficult 
choice about her career, who prays for and gets a sign. I submit that God 
brought it about in the one act of creation that if an agent of type X ever 
comes to exist and in circumstances of type Y prays for a sign then she 
shall have a sign of type Z. (I am for convenience using "If p then q" rather 
than the more accurate rendering of a material conditional as "Either not-p 
or q.") Such direct actualisation of the conditional situation may be con-
trasted with God's bringing about the conditional by preventing the 
antecedent or by ensuring the consequent.4 So, given what God has 
already brought about, it is up to the student to decide whether the 
antecedent is false or the consequent true, by deciding whether to pray or 
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not. In that way the prayer is answered with the sign. 
I note two points. First, DACS does not require there to be any merely 
possible individuals, for the conditional concerns precise types not individ-
uals'. Second, even though the obvious context of ODA is the doctrine of 
the eternity of God I allow the possibility that the divine act could occur at 
a time earlier than the existence of the physical universe even though its 
effects may occur at various different times." 
1. Foreknowledge and answers to prayer 
ODA excludes the common sense thesis that God answers prayer by 
intervening subsequent to the prayer. This leaves only two widely consid-
ered alternatives to DACS: answers to prayer based on divine foreknowl-
edge, and answers to prayer based on middle knowledge.7 I shall consider 
these in tum, arguing that, to be tenable, both the foreknowledge and the 
middle knowledge alternatives to DACS provide precedents for DACS 
itself, and so undermine the objection that DACS is too counter-intuitive to 
be taken seriously. I also argue that within the scope of ODA the fore-
knowledge alternative not merely provides a precedent for DACS but 
implies it. 
First, then, let us consider foreknowledge. I take as representative of an 
answer to prayer based on foreknowledge the case in which prior to cre-
ation God knows that a student of a certain type will pray for a sign and, 
knowing this, creates the universe in such a way that there will be a sign. 
To assess this foreknowledge account we need a distinction between 
prediction, which is foreknowledge only in a loose sense, and precogni-
tion. In both cases we have the true conditional "If the student prayed then 
she got a sign" but the difference concerns what would have happened if 
the student had not prayed. If divine foreknowledge is predictive then there 
would still have been a sign because God would have ensured there was 
one, as a result of an erring prediction. 
Now many hold that divine foreknowledge is necessarily infallible and 
hence the situation in which God makes an erring prediction is impossi-
ble. This, it is widely said, trivialises the "subjunctive" conditional being 
considered, namely "Were the student not to have prayed then there 
would still have been a sign, because God would have ensured there was 
one, as a result of an erring prediction." My response to this is to say that 
not any impossible antecedent trivialises a counterfactual, but only an ana-
lytically false one. So, for example, there would be nothing amiss with "If 
the Morning Star had not been the Evening Star there would have been 
one more planet in the Solar System." If, however, this response is unsatis-
factory and if divine knowledge is necessarily infallible, then I cannot dis-
tinguish divine predictive foreknowledge from precognitive foreknowl-
edge and I need only consider the latter case. 
I stipulate that if divine foreknowledge is precognitive then were the 
student not to have prayed there might not have been a sign. And to 
make the contrast with predictive foreknowledge clearer I ignore the pos-
sibility of God granting a sign for some other reason (eg her friend praying 
that she get a sign) and so restrict attention to the case in which were the 
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student not to have prayed there would not have been a sign. 
The foreknowledge solution faces a dilemma. If the foreknowledge is 
predictive then, I shall argue, the prayer is not the occasion of the sign and 
hence prayers are not really answered. But if foreknowledge is precogni-
tive then it generates problems, which may be solved but only by provid-
ing a precedent for DAC5, or, within the scope of ODA, actually implying 
DAC5. Hence, I argue, the foreknowledge solution either excludes genuine 
answers to prayer or is not a rival to DAC5. 
First consider divine predictive foreknowledge of free choices. I claim 
that a divine capacity to predict cannot explain how God can answer 
prayers. My case for this claim is first to state the prima facie argument, 
then to consider an apparent weakness in the argument, and finally to 
argue that weakness is merely apparent. 
The prima facie argument for my claim is straightforward: 
(l) For prayer to be answered it is necessary that the prayer be the 
occasion of the answer. 
(2)50mething is an occasion only if it satisfies a counterfactual con-
ditional requirement, namely had the occasion not occurred then in 
the circumstances what it occasions would not have occurred. 
(3) But if the prayer is predicted rather than precognised, then the 
apparent answer to prayer would have occurred even if the prayer 
had not occurred. 
50: 
(4)There is no answer to prayer 
Here I make three explanatory remarks: 
(i) I take it that an occasion of an action is something knowledge of 
which provides a reason for the agent to act a certain way, but which 
does not cause the agent to act in that way - unless, and only in so far 
as, reasons are themselves causes. 
(ii) As in more central cases of direct causation the counterfactual 
conditional requirement could be replaced by a raising of probabili-
ties requirement but that would not affect the argument. 
(iii) The premiss (3) might seem counter-intuitive if the prediction 
is infallible, but it is intended to follow from the way I distinguished 
prediction from precognition. 50 if anything is counter-intuitive it is 
the idea of infallible divine prediction as opposed to precognition. 
The weak point in the argument, if there is one, is (1), which expresses a 
putative necessary condition for there to be an answer to prayer. It might 
be objected that an instrumentalist hypothesis will suffice, namely that for 
there to be an answer to prayer it is sufficient that answers are as if occa-
sioned by prayers. To clarify this instrumentalist hypothesis further I ask 
whether it is thought of as holding both at the time of the prayer or only 
after the answer. From the latter perspective it is as if the prayer occa-
sioned the answer just in case there was both a prayer and an answer. 
Clearly that is too weak as an account of answers to prayer. But we should 
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take seriously the proposal that even before the prayer is made it is as if the 
prayer occasions the answer. This leads to the following proposed suffi-
cient condition for a prayer to be answered: 
(5) If the choice is made to pray there will be an answer - in this 
case a sign; if the choice is not made to pray there will be no answer. 
As in the previous case a more subtle condition in terms of probabilities 
will not affect the discussion. 
In terms of possible world analyses of conditionals the difference 
between the future indicative conditional of (5) and the "subjunctive" con-
ditional of (3) is that: 
(i) For the "subjunctive" conditional we consider a world in 
which everything prior to the choice whether to pray is just like the 
actual one but then a quite unpredicted choice is made not to pray. 
The consequent is then whatever holds in that world. 
(ii) For the future conditional, we consider a world very like this 
except that there is a choice not to pray. Unlike the previous case this 
choice not to pray is made in a normal and, hence, it is being sup-
posed, predictable, fashion. So the events prior to the choice must 
have differed slightly. 
The future conditional requirement may well hold in a situation in 
which there is divine predictive foreknowledge. For if the choice is made 
not to pray then God predicts this and so there will be no sign. 
The prima facie argument depends, then, on a necessary condition for 
there to be an answer to prayer. The argument fails, then if this condition 
is not really necessary. And, it could be said, there is a sufficient condition, 
namely the instrumentalist account explicated as (5), which can hold even 
when the proposed necessary condition fails to. Hence to make out my 
case I need to argue against this instrumentalist account. 
One reason for rejecting the instrumentalist account of prayer is that 
petitionary prayer differs from other forms of prayer in that the intention is 
precisely to make a difference to things - and not just by altering yourself. 
The instrumentalist account of prayer suffers then from a pragmatic incon-
sistency: no one believing it is merely as if prayers occasion answers can 
reasonably have the intention required for a genuine petitionary prayer.R 
Another reason for rejecting the instrumentalist account of prayer is based 
on the following sort of case. Suppose the student asked for a specific sign, 
sayan A grade. Suppose that, unknown to her, the grade has already been 
assigned when she prays. Suppose also that God, predicting that she 
would pray in this way, arranged for her to get the grade. On the instru-
mentalist account this is indeed an answer to prayer. Moreover, the future 
conditional requirement is satisfied. I hold, however, the common sense 
view that in such cases it is indeed too late for God to answer her prayer. 
For by the time the prayer is made it is true that she has the grade, so the 
prayer can make no difference. Perhaps it will be replied that it is true she 
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has the grade only because God foreknows that she will pray, so were she 
to decide at the last moment not to pray then there would have been no 
sign. But that reply succeeds, if it does, only if the foreknowledge is pre-
cognitive. Examples such as these should reinforce the belief that genuine 
answers to prayer must be occasioned by the prayer and hence that the 
counterfactual conditional requirement holds. 
I conclude that predictive foreknowledge is not compatible with gen-
uine answers to prayer. Let us turn to precognitive foreknowledge. In this 
case we have the two problems which Hunt raises quite generally for 
divine foreknowledge, the Doxastic Problem and the Metaphysical 
Problem.9 The Doxastic Problem is based on the principle that no agent can 
decide to do what that agent already knows will happen. There may be 
many solutions to this problem, but one is to restrict divine foreknowledge 
to knowledge of situations not brought about by God. Since such situations 
as the student praying for a sign entail the existence of a physical universe 
of a certain kind, this solution requires that the foreknown situations be 
conditional ones, such as that if there is a student of type X in situation of 
type Y then that student will pray for a sign. God, foreknowing this and 
other conditional situations, could therefore create in such a way that there 
will be a student of type X in situation of type Y and there will be a sign of 
type Z. Thus the Doxastic Problem shows at most that foreknowledge be 
restricted to conditionals, not that God directly actualise conditional situa-
tions, which is the position I am defending. Nonetheless even so the pro-
posed solution to the Doxastic Problem supports DACS, by undermining 
the objection that there are no such things as conditional situations, but 
only categorical ones. For if there were no such things as conditional situa-
tions how can God know them without knowing about their antecedents 
or consequents? 
To illustrate the Metaphysical Problem, suppose the existence of the stu-
dent who prays for a sign is itself the consequence of an earlier answer to 
prayer - perhaps her parents had a surfeit of sons and prayed for a daugh-
ter. Then the act of creation by which, among other things, the student's 
prayer is answered is based on foreknowledge that the prayer is made, 
which itself depends on the prayer being made and hence on the act of cre-
ation by which, among other things, the parents' prayer was granted. 
Unless there are multiple acts of creation this threatens circularity. But 
ODA implies there is only a single act of creation. To avoid circularity, we 
require God to create a situation in which the prayer is answered if the 
appropriate circumstances do occur. That is: If a person of type X comes to 
exist and be in situation of type Y then there will be a sign of type Z. 
Bringing about such a conditional situation depends only on an item of 
foreknowledge which is itself independent of creation, namely that if a per-
son of Type X comes to exist and be in situation of type Y then that person 
prays. This saves the foreknowledge account of prayer, but only by posit-
ing DACS itself. 
2. Middle knowledge to the rescue? 
Middle knowledge would enable God to know what a precise type of 
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person in a precise type of situation would do without having to know 
whether there is a person of that type. My aim in this section is not to argue 
directly against middle knowledge but to show that the middle knowledge 
account of answers to prayer also provides a precedent for DACS. 
Whether or not it deserves to be called middle knowledge, a certain 
amount of knowledge of counterfactuals would follow from precognitive 
foreknowledge. For example God could foreknow that on all the many 
other occasions in which the student has to make an important decision 
she prays for a sign. Knowing this God would infer that were she to be in 
the situation in which she has to decide on her career, then she would pray 
for a sign. In that case God could use this knowledge to bring about a 
world in which the sign is given. 
The resort to precognitive foreknowledge threatened circularity. The sit-
uation is at least as bad for middle knowledge which depends on fore-
knowledge. For the decision to create the world in such a way that there is 
a sign depends on the middle knowledge which depends on the fore-
knowledge of what a person of a certain precise type will do, which 
depends on the world being created in such a way that there is a person of 
that type X. If we avoid this circularity by saying that both the foreknowl-
edge and the creation are of conditional situations then we have saved 
middle knowledge only by accepting DACS. 
Clearly if middle knowledge is to be a rival to DACS we need an alter-
native account of it. Now we should reject the absurd hypothesis that indi-
vidual essences make free choices in a way that is logically prior to their 
instantiation as actual creatures - as if God sees whether we freely do 
accept grace before deciding to reward us by creation. For want of an alter-
native, I think that mesocognitivists are committed, then, to saying that the 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true without depending for their 
truth on other, more fundamental, facts either about the creatures or God. 
This, which I take to be Plantinga's position, I call ICCF (independent 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom}.!O Given that there are these unsup-
ported facts it then follows from divine omniscience that God knows them. 
And perhaps we should not ask how. 
My present task, then, is to argue that ICCF provides a precedent for 
DACS. In both cases we have a conditional situation which does not 
depend on other occurrences, although it constrains them. On ICCF the 
conditional, which is a "subjunctive" one, is known but not brought about 
by God. On DACS the conditional, which is a material one, is brought 
about by God. If DACS is problematic then so is ICCF. Indeed because 
there is no explanation of how the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom 
come about I judge ICCF to be the more problematic of the two. 
3. In defence of the Direct Actualisation of Conditional Situations 
I have argued that DACS is no worse than the appeal to either fore-
knowledge or middle knowledge, because both those appeals provide a 
precedent for DACS. But that might be construed as a criticism of the fore-
knowledge and middle knowledge accounts of prayer, rather than, as I 
hoped, a defence of my proposed account. I shall, therefore, now offer an 
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independent defence of DACS. 
Why should there be any objection to God directly actualising material 
conditional situations? As far as I can see the objection is that for God to 
actualise a situation that situation must be possible. So, for example, we 
might well have doubts as to whether God could create persons who exist-
ed only at the weekends. And the reasons for these doubts would be the 
further doubt that the situation in which persons go out of and come into 
existence is even possible. To defend DACS, then, I need to consider situa-
tions indeterminate between the consequent of a conditional and the nega-
tion of its antecedent. And I need to argue that such situations are possible. 
I begin my defence with three arguments which are ad hominem in the 
Lockean sense of being audience-specific. 
First, a possible Hume-inspired but non-Humean account of laws of 
nature is that they are merely those conjunctions of weakly necessary con-
ditional situations which we human beings properly classify together as 
exhibiting a suitably simple form. Theists will probably go on to give an 
account of weak necessity in terms of God's creative act. II Such an account 
will explain how laws support counterfactuals and distinguish them from 
accidentally true regularities which we might mistake for laws. An ad 
hominem argument, then, to those who find such an account congenial is 
that it requires realism about conditional situations. 
Another ad hominem argument is to those who are inspired by 
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle to propose that the uncertainty in the 
position and momentum of a particle reflects a lack of determinacy.12 For in 
that case we could set up situations in which if a particle has momentum 
with magnitude in set A then it goes through one slit, if in set B it goes 
through the other. We could do this without the situation specifying 
whether the magnitude was in A or B. Hence quantum mechanics, thus 
interpreted, itself implies DACS. 
The third ad hominem concerns van Inwagen's account of chance 
events." He considers God to bring about disjunctive situations without 
bringing about either disjunct. Likewise DACS requires God to bring about 
disjunctive situations without bringing about either disjunct. To be sure, in 
the case of DACS one disjunct involves a negation. Even so, any who are 
persuaded by van Inwagen, as I am, are half way towards accepting 
DACS. 
In addition to these ad hominem arguments I defend DACS by sketch-
ing what I call the Increasing Determinacy account of creation." It is based 
on time-indexed possibility. Prior to creation there is not a state of deter-
minate absence of the physical. Rather all metaphysically possible worlds 
are still possible, so what is then actual is totally indeterminate between all 
possibilities. But creation restricts the range of worlds so that far fewer are 
still possible. (Here, it should be noted, worlds are spatio-temporal entities 
- the act of creation does not just restrict what happens at some putative 
first moment of time.) Likewise on those occasions in which we act freely 
we too restrict the range of what is still possible. Thus each free act con-
tracts the range of worlds so that fewer are still possible. On this account 
what is actual at any time is necessary at all later times. Given ODA it fol-
lows that at creation the history of our world was indeterminate precisely 
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in so far as God initially left matters up to creaturely freedom and chance. 
It is now quite easy to see how God would actualise a material condi-
tional situation without either ensuring the consequent or preventing the 
antecedent. God in the one act of creation restricts the range of worlds 
still possible to those in which either the antecedent will be false or the 
consequent will be true. But God includes in the range of still possible 
worlds some in which the antecedent will be true and some in which it 
will be false. 
4. Is answer to prayer supernatural? 
I have been defending DACS as a way of showing how even an eternal 
God, who acts only once, can answer petitionary prayers. I now argue 
that answers to prayer need not be supernatural. Clearly, if aDA holds 
then no answer to prayer is supernatural in the sense of involving a diVIne 
intervention subsequent to the act of creation. But that is quite consistent 
with there being events which are supernatural in one of the following 
senses: 
(i) Events which when conjoined with earlier events violate a law 
of nature. 
(ii) Events whose probability of occurrence in the circumstances is 
significantly lower than other events or situations described at the 
same level of detail. 
The clause "at the same level of detail" is required because in many sit-
uations every outcome described at the level of detail of the answer to 
prayer is improbable, just because there are so many outcomes. The second 
sense is important because contemporary physics would allow for instance 
the water at the marriage feast of Cana to be turned into wine - it is just 
highly improbable. 
The point of my arguing that answers to prayer are not supernatural 
occurrences is that I grant there is a presumption against the supernatural 
in either of these two senses, although I think the strength of this presump-
tion is often exaggerated. 
Here I rely on the Increasing Determinacy account of creation, described 
above. Consider the set of worlds which are left still possible by the act of 
creation. Call this Pc:. I shall now put two constraints on Pc which are jointly 
sufficient for there to be non-supernatural answers to prayer. The first is 
that Pc be a subset of WN, the set of worlds in which the actual laws of 
nature hold and in which there are no highly improbable signs which could 
reasonably be taken as answers to prayer. To state the second constraint 
consider all the petitionary prayers which God ensures will have answers if 
they are made. I require that for each one of them Pc contains worlds in 
which the circumstances occur in which the prayer might be made, but in 
which the prayer is not made, and in which there is no answer. I also 
require that Pc contains worlds in which the prayer is made and there is an 
answer. These two conditions are sufficient to ensure that many petitionary 
prayers have been answered in a non-supernatural fashion. 
I can think of two objections to my proposed account. The first 
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objection only holds if the laws of nature are deterministic. For then 
the worlds in W" which differ now have always differed in some 
respects. Hence, if, as I assume, it was still possible a year ago for the 
student to pray this year for a sign and it was still possible for her not to 
pray, then, assuming deterministic laws, it was still possible a year ago 
for events a million years ago to have been such as to lead up to the 
prayer and still possible for them to have been such as lead up to the 
absence of prayer. In this way we arrive at the counter-intuitive conse-
quence that the past events can be indeterminate. This difficulty is par-
tially removed by noting that even deterministic laws allow that very 
small differences in the past result in quite significant differences later 
on. So the past indeterminacy is not such as we humans would have 
noticed. Nonetheless I grant that the occurrence of past indeterminacy 
is counter-intuitive. If the laws are not deterministic then this objection 
lapses. 
The other objection is that there might just not be sufficient variation 
in the non-supernatural worlds for there to be enough worlds to ensure 
that in all, or at least most, cases of prayer there are two outcomes 
depending on whether the prayer was made or not. Suppose there are 
N prayers. Then it would seem there need to be at least 2" non-supernat-
ural worlds corresponding to the combinations of prayer and absence of 
prayer on N occasions. N is presumably very large, so it is not silly to 
worry about whether there are enough possible non-supernatural 
worlds for God to ensure that the outcomes depend on whether there is 
prayer or not. Fortunately some, admittedly rough, estimates suggest 
that the fine tuning of even as little as a milligram of hydrogen can be 
performed in sufficiently many ways to ensure possible non-supernatur-
al worlds with appropriate outcomes for, say, 1,000 petitionary prayers 
a year for an average population of 100,000,000 over a million years. IS 
Each planet, of course, condenses out of millions of millions of grams of 
dust, so the fine tuning of that cloud contains enormously more varia-
tion than required. 
I conclude that the one act of creation can, without any supernatural 
events, bring about material conditionals so that every free choice has 
outcomes depending on the choice in a way ordained by God. This 
applies in particular to answers to prayer. I acknowledge, however, that 
the combination of deterministic laws with the requirement that answers 
to prayer not be supernatural results in the counter-intuitive ascription 
of indeterminacy to past events. 
The University of New England 
* A shorter version of this paper was read to the 1996 Pacific Regional 
Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers (Seattle April 19-20). I am 
indebted to all who contributed to the discussion on that occasion. In addition, 
I am indebted to Linda Zagzebski and an anonymous referee for some 
extremely helpful comments. 
NOTES 
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1. An eternal God might act more than once provided there was no tem-
poral relation between the acts. But another thesis of classical theism, divine 
simplicity would exclude this. 
2. In the game of Simon Says various orders are to be obeyed if and only if 
prefixed with the words "Simon Says." 
3. Or, if that is God's purpose, material biconditional situations. For sim-
plicity of exposition I consider only material conditionals. Similar hypotheses 
are obtained if we consider other kinds of conditional, for instance that neces-
sarily the antecedent is false or the consequent true. 
4. A further possibility would be that God ensures the material condition-
al by bringing about a law of nature which implies that conditional. Since no 
one has proposed this account of prayer I do not need to object to it in detail. It 
suffices to say that such laws would turn prayer into a kind of magic and, 
moreover, be intolerably complicated. 
5. I am indebted to Barry Miller for drawing my attention to the problems 
of merely possible or future individuals. See his From Existence to God (London: 
Routledge, 1992) ch. 3. See also Robert M. Adams, "Actualism and Thisness," 
Synthese, 57 (1981): 3-42. In this paper I am quite neutral about whether there 
are future individuals. 
6. For an account of how this is possible even for an infinitely old universe 
see my God without the Supernatural, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996) ch 
2. 
7. A variant on middle knowledge would be to rely on what Howsepian 
has called middle action. I leave it to readers to adapt my discussion of middle 
knowledge to middle action. See A. A. Howsepian, "Middle Actions," 
international JOllrnal for Philosophy of Religion, 34, (1993):13-28. 
8. This is inspired by William Alston, "Divine-Human Dialogue," Faith 
and Philosophy, 2 (1985): 5-20, especially Section Eleven. I have to admit, 
though, that DACS turns prayer into the analog of a telephone answering sys-
tem ("Press One if you want the times of examinations; press Two if you want 
information on scholarships; etc.") As far as I can see if God is eternal the near-
est thing to a genuine dialogue with God would be dialogue with God incar-
nate. 
9. See David P. Hunt, "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge," 
Faith and Philosophy, 10 (1993): 394-414, especially 398. 
10. In The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974: 184-90.) 
Alvin Plantinga discusses Mayor Curley's "transworld depravity" in such a 
way that it would be puzzling if God knew of it by knowing something else. 
But if they depend on other facts for their truth why would not God know 
them by knowing these other facts? 
11. The simplest theistic account of weak necessity is that everything 
directly brought about by God in the one act of creation is weakly necessary. 
But that account only succeeds if we assume that God leaves a lot up to either 
chance or creaturely freedom. A more flexible account might be obtained by 
adapting Del Ratzsch's account in "Nomo(theo)logical Necessity," Faith and 
Philosophy, 4, (1987): 383-402, so as to make it compatible with ODA. We could 
then say that things are weakly necessary if God brought them about in the 
one act of creation and would still have brought them about even if God had 
decided to create a world differing from this one only in the different outcomes 
for free creaturely choices. (I am using the phrase 'weak necessity' rather than 
Ratzsche's 'natural necessity' to avoid begging questions against the supernat-
ural.) 
12. I defended such an indeterminacy interpretation in my Quantum 
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Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988) ch 7 . 
. 13. See Peter van Inwagen, "The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by 
God," Diville Ilnd Humlln Action, ed. Thomas V. Morris, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988) : 211-235. 
14. See my God without the Supernatural (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996): 83-5. See also my, "Physical necessity and the passage of time" in Riggs, 
P. J. (ed.), Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology, Australasian 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996). 
15. This leads to an estimate for the number of choices to pray of l(}'" Call 
that N. Taking the answers to prayer to be commonplace events, the chance of 
a given outcome being appropriate would be, say, 1 in 100. So the chance of a 
non supernatural world chosen at random having a sequence of N appropriate 
outcomes for a given sequence of N choices is 1 in M where M = 100". If we 
now choose K such worlds at random the chance of there being among them 
ones in which for all sequence of choices we have appropriate outcomes can be 
calculated, provided we assume probabilistic independence. It turns out to be 1 
- exp(-K/M). For instance if K = M it would be about 2/3. If we put K = 100M 
the probability will differ from 100% by a negligible amount. So it is virtually 
certain that 100M non supernatural worlds chosen at random and indepen-
dently will contain all those needed for the divine purpose in ensuring appro-
priate outcomes for free creatures on Earth. Now 100M is the enormous num-
ber, 100N+1. Nonetheless it is still small compared to the number of non super-
natural worlds. For suppose we consider a gram of hydrogen and consider not 
the whole continuum of its states but just those which occur if we think of each 
molecule as moving either up or down. The number of states is then 2" where 
A is Avogradro's number 6xlO2J = 60,000N. So 2'\ = 26\1."°°", which is vastly 
greater than 100N+1. 
